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Summary of Findings 
 
While overall homicide levels in the United States have fluctuated minimally in 
recent years, those involving young victims and perpetrators—particularly young 
black males—have surged. 
 
From 2002 to 2007, the number of homicides involving black male juveniles as 
victims rose by 31% and as perpetrators by 43%. In terms of gun killings 
involving this same population subgroup, the increases were even more 
pronounced: 54% for young black male victims and 47% for young black male 
perpetrators.  
 
The increase in homicide among black youth, coupled with a smaller increase or 
even decrease among their white counterparts, was consistently true for every 
region of the country and nearly all population groupings of cities. The pattern 
also held individually for a majority of states and major cities. 
 
After some decline during the 1990s, the percentage of homicides that involve a 
gun has increased since 2000, both among young white offenders and black 
offenders of all age ranges. The percentage of gun homicides for young black 
offenders has reached nearly 85%. These trends are concomitant with various 
legislative initiatives at the federal level that have lessened the extent of 
surveillance on illegal gun markets. 
 
Time-of-day patterns of violent crime victimization for youngsters, ages 6-17, 
reveal clear differences between school days and out-of-school periods. On 
school days, the risk spikes during the after-school hours—the primetime for 
juvenile crime---while the late evening hours are most problematic on non-school 
days, particularly summertime weekends. 
 
Future demographics suggest that the concern for at-risk youth should increase 
over the next decade. The number of black and Hispanic children should 
continue to expand, contrasting with the rather limited increase expected among 
Caucasian children. There is a significant need for reinvestment in children and 
families—in essence an at-risk youth bailout during these difficult economic 
times. 
 
Federal support for policing and youth violence prevention has declined sharply 
in recent years, perhaps precipitated by complacency brought about by the 
significant 1990s decline in crime. The resurgence in homicide, especially among 
minority youth, signals the importance of restoring federal funds for crime 
prevention and crime control. 
________________________________________________________________ 
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At least on the surface, the news from the crime front has seemed 
encouraging. The FBI, in its recent release of crime figures for the nation, 
reported that violent crime in 2007 was down across the board compared to 
2006, including a 1.3% decline in murder. Although welcomed and widely 
applauded, the news contrasts sharply with the experience of countless 
Americans living (and some dying) in violence-infested neighborhoods—those for 
whom the frightening sound of gunfire is a far too frequent occurrence. 
 
 It is not that the FBI figures tell an inaccurate story about crime trends in 
America. Rather, they obscure the divergent tale of two communities—one 
prosperous and safe, the other poor and crime-ridden. The truth behind the fears 
and concerns of the nation’s underclasses about crime and violence lies deep 
beneath the surface of the FBI statistical report.      
 
Recent Homicide Trends 
 
 Over the past few years for the nation as a whole, rates of violence, and 
homicide in particular, have been relatively stable, with rather modest fluctuations 
since the beginning of the decade. Exploring deeper, this is generally the case as 
well for whites, black females, and adult black males over the age of 25. But the 
picture for young black males, especially teenagers, is radically different.  
 
Figures 1-2 display the percentage change over the past five years in the 
estimated number of homicide victims and offenders (see technical notes on p. 8) 
among selected groups (males, male juveniles, black male juveniles, and black 
male juveniles involving a gun). As shown, between 2002 and 2007, the number 
of homicides involving black male juveniles as victims grew by 31% and as 
perpetrators by 43%. In terms of gun killings involving this same population 
subgroup, the increases were even more pronounced: 54% for young black male 
victims and 47% for young black male perpetrators.  
 
Greater detail pertaining to the number of victims and offenders by age, 
sex and race—separately and in combination—is provided in Tables 1-3 for each 
year since 2000. In order to lessen the effects of the volatility from year-to-year in 
measuring trend, the percentage change rates included in these and other tables 
compare pooled counts for 2006 and 2007 against a baseline of pooled counts 
for 2000 and 2001.  By this gauge, the number of males committing homicide has 
increased, particularly for young black males (14-17 and 18-24) and especially 
involving a gun. 
 
Moving below the national level, the increase in homicides by black 
youthful offenders is consistent for all nine geographic regions and nearly all 
population subgroups, as shown in Tables 4-5, suggesting that the problem is not 
limited to only certain parts of the country.  Moreover, these increases contrast 
with smaller increases and even decreases among white youth.  
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Finally, Tables 6-7 provide similar percentage change calculations, 
separately for white and black youthful offenders, for states as well as cities with 
populations over 500,000 and more than 25 overall homicides annually. Given 
the smaller base figures at the local level, the change rates are more volatile. 
Overall, however, a majority of states and a majority of cities have experienced 
increases in homicides committed by young black offenders compared with 
smaller increases or even decreases among their white counterparts. 
 
Long Term Homicide Trends  
 
 While recent increases in homicides involving young offenders, particularly 
black males, are of significant concern, when compared to the longer term trends 
of the past few decades, a different perspective emerges. Tables 8-9 and Figures 
3-4 contain the rates of victimization and offending per 100,000 population for 
males by age and race from 1976 to 2007.  The recent surge in homicide among 
young black males clearly falls far short of the extraordinarily high levels 
witnessed during the crack-related street gang wars of the late 1980s and early 
1990s. In fact, the recent increases may say more about the success of crime 
prevention and crime control efforts of the past decade than about contemporary 
failures. In essence, the recent apparent spike in violence indicates that the 
nation is victim of its earlier success. Were it not for the 1990s downturn, recent 
figures would hardly stand out as cause for alarm. 
 
 Actually, there are naturally-occurring cycles to crime rates. Although not 
as firm and deterministic as Newton’s law of gravity, when it comes to the crime 
rate, what goes up, generally comes down, and what goes down generally 
rebounds.  While no level of victimization can be termed “acceptable,” compared 
to the early 1990s when a deadly mix of gangs, guns and emerging crack 
markets fueled an unprecedented surge in violence, the current state is not out of 
control. Reinvestment in the programs and strategies that worked successfully in 
the past, along with restored funding levels for policing and prevention, can 
reverse the current spate of street and gang violence. 
 
The Role of Firearms 
 
 The role of firearms in the recent increase in youth killings, shown in 
Figure 5 (and Table 10) is particularly significant and noteworthy. The percentage 
of homicides involving a gun has risen to nearly 85% among young black 
offenders, matching the high-point reached during the early 1990s. The 
percentage of gun homicides for young white offenders has also grown in recent 
years, though not quite equaling the level seen during the early 1990s. While the 
role of guns in homicides committed by older white offenders has continued its 
steady decline of the past few decades, gun use among black offenders over age 
25 has rebounded in recent years.   
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The especially prominent upturn since 2000 in gun homicide coincides 
with legislative restrictions upon ATF regarding the dissemination of gun tracing 
information and other pro-gun legislation that passed through Congress early in 
this decade. Congress has passed amendments in recent years making it more 
difficult to identify illegal market sources of crime guns through ATF data.  
 
It is noteworthy that increases since 2000 in gun killings by young 
offenders have occurred as levels of non-gun homicide remained relatively flat or 
even decreased. This divergence suggests the need to rethink our nation’s 
approach to reducing availability of firearms to young offenders—those who are 
more apt to pull the trigger, even over trivial matters, without fully considering the 
consequences for themselves, much less for others. 
 
Primetime for Juvenile Crime 
 
Regardless of trend, be it upward, downward or stable, the concern for the 
safety of children is genuine and critical.  With parents spending less time 
supervising their children—some out of choice, others out of necessity for the 
sake of managing expenses, and a few out of sheer indifference or negligence—
an increasing number of youngsters are unsupervised during out-of-school 
hours. Poor supervision, combined with idleness and boredom, is a recipe for 
trouble. Far too many youngsters, therefore, are especially at-risk during the 
afterschool hours for a range of problems, such as violence, as well as drinking, 
drug use, and teen pregnancy.  
 
 Figures 6-7 display the time-of-day patterns of violent victimization for 
2006 among juveniles, ages 6 through 17, separately for the months between 
September and June when school is in session and the two summer months of 
school vacation. Clearly, the incidence of victimization peaks in the after school 
hours—the primetime for juvenile crime—when many parents are working and 
kids are often unsupervised, and then begins to tail off in the evening hours when 
parents typically are home to monitor their children. Weekend days during the 
school year reflect a very different pattern in which the evening hours are more 
problematic. The summer months reveal patterns that are close to that for 
weekend days of the school year. However, the pronounced peak in the late 
evening hours of weekend days in the summertime warrants special attention in 
terms of providing constructive programs and alternative forms of supervision. 
  
Attraction of Gangs 
 
 Notwithstanding the tale of official crime statistics, it hardly takes a rocket 
scientist—or a research criminologist—to recognize that there are increasing 
numbers of wayward and poorly-supervised youngsters with guns in their hands 
and gangs in their plans. Regrettably, as the nation celebrated the successful 
fight against violent crime back in the 1990s, we grew complacent and eased up 
on our crime-fighting efforts. Unfortunately, the crime problem and the gang 
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problem do not disappear, and rebounded once we shifted priorities elsewhere. 
Unless we restore the sense of urgency, some day we may look back and call 
these the “good old days.” 
 
 Even while targeting gangs for intensive enforcement, we need also 
understand their special appeal. Gangs offer youngsters many desirable 
advantages—status, excitement, power, praise, profit, protection, mentoring, and 
opportunity for advancement—healthy goals fulfilled in unhealthy ways. Today’s 
youngsters who are drawn to gang membership are too young to have witnessed 
the gang wars of the early 1990s when joining a gang could mean an early 
grave.  
 
 Our challenge, therefore, is to identify and promote healthier means for 
youngsters to achieve the same need-fulfillment, constructive ways to feel good 
about themselves and their prospects for the future, while at the same time 
having fun. This, of course, is where programs like the Boys and Girls Clubs and 
other youth enrichment initiatives play a significant role, and a role that, given 
ongoing trends, needs to be expanded.  
 
 While many Americans rail on about underage, underprepared, and 
undermotivated parents “who just need to do a better job of raising and 
supervising their children,” we recognize that these families cannot do it on their 
own. We must assist families, not assail them, when they become overwhelmed 
with the day-to-day struggles of raising children, particularly during an economic 
downturn. The alternative forms of supervision and mentoring are extraordinarily 
critical. 
 
Future Possibilities 
 
 The fact that the problem of youth violence, especially among minorities, 
has emerged and persisted for several years suggests that it is hardly an 
aberration or statistical blip. Moreover, it could worsen in the years ahead as the 
population of at-risk youth (blacks and Hispanics) grows as a result of both 
demographic patterns and immigration.  Figure 8 shows projected trends in the 
numbers of young children—infants and toddlers under age 5—over the next 
decade, using the 2008 counts as a baseline. While the number of white children 
should change minimally, the pattern is remarkably different among race and 
ethnic minorities. The number of black children is projected to grow in the years 
ahead. Growth in the number of Hispanic children, partially tied to immigration 
patterns, is especially pronounced. Given the social and economic strains that 
unevenly impact minority communities, growth in the population of at-risk youth 
signals the clear potential for increased problems of homicide, violence and other 
social ills associated with an expanding population of underclass youngsters.  
Whether these demographic trends translate into increasing crime problems 
ahead largely depends on our willingness to be proactive. The urgency is clear: 
we must reinvest in children—not just for the purpose of crime prevention, but for 
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the wide range of benefits associated with promoting their healthy and successful 
development. 
 
Untimely Budget Cuts 
 
Lulled into complacency by the sharp decline in crime during the 1990s, 
our nation’s priorities appear to have moved away from fighting street crime. A 
triple whammy at the federal level—related to cops, guns and kids—has 
hampered proven strategies for crime control.  
 
Federal appropriations in support of law enforcement have been slashed 
since the early part of the decade, as reflected in Figure 9 in relation to funds for 
the Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) initiative as well as the Byrne 
Justice Assistance Grants (JAG) program. In addition, federal support for juvenile 
justice and prevention programs (Juv Just) has been reduced by half, now a 
shadow of the former investment.   
 
Drastic funding cuts have led to a significant reduction in police resources 
among large cities, those with populations of more than 250,000. Specifically, as 
shown in Figure 10, the number of police officers per 1,000 population for large 
cities has dropped 8.5% since the year 2000, with most of the decline occurring 
in the first few years of the decade. By contrast, the level of police protection in 
cities with populations under 250,000 has remained virtually constant.  
 
Of course, much of the decline can be traced to the changing priorities 
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on America. Much of the federal 
support for law enforcement shifted from hometown security in patrolling high 
crime neighborhoods to homeland security in protecting the nation’s 
transportation, government and financial centers. Regardless of the level of 
terrorist threat, however, many more Americans are murdered each year by 
gunfire than were killed on 9/11. While the focus on combating terrorism is 
undeniably important, we cannot lose sight of the carnage taking place on our 
city streets. 
 
In these difficult economic times, the banking and automobile industries 
have looked to the federal government for assistance. Where is the voice to 
appeal on behalf of the needs of at-risk youth, as various support programs for 
children and families are being slashed?  We need an at-risk youth bailout. 
 
Principles of Prevention 
 
 Unfortunately, not all Americans are convinced about the value of 
prevention—especially early childhood and youth enrichment efforts.  As a result, 
prevention initiatives are too often funded and implemented on a shoe-string, and 
a rather short shoe-string with a brief window of opportunity to show results. This 
is a recipe for failure and provides additional fodder for skeptics. 
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 Smart crime fighting involves a balanced blend of enforcement (from 
community policing to identifying illegal gun markets), treatment modalities (from 
drug rehab on demand to community corrections and post-incarceration services) 
as well as general and targeted crime prevention (from family support to summer 
jobs for high-risk youth). Regrettably, the prevention approach has at times been 
disparaged as “worthless” and as “soft of crime.” Yet, this cynical perspective 
reflects gross misunderstanding of the process and goals of prevention, and a 
selective examination of outcomes. Simply put: Prevention programs can work; 
good prevention programs that are well-implement do work.  
 
 Besides the matter of funding adequacy, five fundamental principles of 
crime and violence prevention are critical for effective investment: 
 
1. No program is successful all the time or for all individuals.  Regardless of the 
initiative, there will be failures—those who commit crimes or recidivate 
despite best efforts to prevent it. Rather than focusing on the failures, the goal 
should be a reasonable reduction in offending rates. In light of the enormous 
social and administrative costs associated with each criminal act, even 
modest gains are worthwhile. 
 
2. Prevention should have an emphasis on the prefix “pre.” While it is unwise 
and inappropriate to “give up” on even a seemingly hardened offender, the 
greatest opportunity for positive impact comes with a focus on children—
those who are young and impressionable and will be impressed with what a 
teacher, preacher or some other authority figure has to say. It is well-known 
that early prevention—during grade school if not earlier—can carry the 
greatest and lasting impact, before a youngster is seduced by gangs, drugs 
and crime.  
 
3. Patience is more than a virtue, it is a requirement. Prevention is not a short-
term strategy. Rather, it involves a continued effort, undaunted by setbacks. 
Unfortunately, many prevention programs are given short window periods in 
which to show progress, and are often terminated before the final results are 
seen. 
 
4. Prevention should take a multi-faceted approach. Understandably, there is 
much temptation to target gang activity as perhaps the most visible and 
immediate threat to public safety. While the focus on anti-gang initiatives is 
laudable and should be strengthened, there are many other points of 
intervention for successful crime reduction programming. For example, 
several proven and promising strategies are directed at at-risk families with 
young children. Rather than criticizing struggling underage mothers for their 
lack of parenting effectiveness, many programs support them in raising 
children who are less likely to become juvenile offenders. In addition, many 
school-based initiatives effectively and efficiently enhance the well-being of 
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large number of children. Behavioral skills training at the elementary school 
level (such as the modules developed by Boston’s Lesson One Foundation), 
anti-bulling curricula for middle school students (such as the Olweus bullying 
prevention program) that recognize the link between bullying and later 
offending, peer-mediation and mentoring program in high school, after-school 
activities targeted at the “prime time for juvenile crime” (such as the Boys and 
Girls Clubs) all have payoffs far greater than the investment. 
 
5. Prevention is significantly cost-effective. Virtually all assessments of crime 
prevention confirm the adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 
prison time. It is, however, a political reality that sound investments in crime 
prevention can take years to reap the benefits. For example, the Perry pre-
school program experiment implemented in Ypsilanti, Michigan translated into 
a 17-to-1 rate of return on investment, yet it wasn’t until years later when the 
preschoolers matured that their significantly lower involvement in crime, 
alcohol and drug abuse was observed. It takes a bold leader to earmark funds 
today for tomorrow’s success that his/her successor will derive. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The current surge in youth violence was anticipated years ago. Even while 
rates of crime were falling in the 1990s, criminologists warned about the potential 
for another wave of youth and gang violence ahead, a not-so-perfect storm 
combining an upward trend in the at-risk youth population with a downward trend 
in spending on social and educational programs to support youth. 
 
 Furthermore, we should not be surprised if the concomitant increase in the 
number of at-risk youth, especially black and Hispanic children with less than 
adequate supervision, combined with recent budget cuts for youth programs and 
crime control initiatives, translates into further increases in gang and gun 
violence. We’re already seeing the early signs. 
 
 The good news--or at least the encouraging word--is that the crime 
problem is not out of control, at least by contrast to the early 1990s when the 
nation’s murder rate was almost twice what it is today. It is not surprising that a 
small bounce back would occur after the glory years of the late 1990s. But let this 
small upturn serve as a thunderous wake-up call that crime prevention needs to 
be a priority once again. 
 
 At this juncture, we must, of course, look toward immediate solutions for 
controlling gang activity and easy access to illegal firearms—approaches that 
depend heavily on police personnel, intelligence, and deployment. At the same 
time, however, we must maintain a long-range view toward the future as the 
population of young children—especially race and ethnic minorities—grows. The 
choice is ours: pay for the programs now or pray for the victims later. 
 8
Data Sources and Technical Notes 
 
 Several data sources were used in completion of this report. Most 
prominently, the data on homicide victimization and offending come from a 
multiply-imputed cumulative file of the Supplementary Homicide Reports for the 
years 1976-2007, created by the authors. Compiled as part of the FBI’s Uniform 
Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) 
include incident-level data on the month and year of the offense; on the reporting 
agency and its residential population, county, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 
codes, geographic division, and population group; on the age, sex, and race of all 
victims and offenders; and on the victim–offender relationship, weapon use, and 
circumstances of the crime. The SHR records are incomplete on a small 
percentage (2.5%) of victims, yet a substantial percentage (32.5%) of 
perpetrators largely as a result of unsolved offenses. However, a process of 
multiple-imputation was employed to fill in the gaps (based on available 
information about the incomplete reports) so that characteristics of victims and 
offenders can be reliably and accurately estimated. In addition, approximately 
eight percent of homicides are not covered in the SHR data files. To adjust for 
under-reporting, adjustment weights were applied based on comparisons to 
mortality data from coroners’ reports and to the aggregated homicide counts 
reported by the FBI in the Crime in the United States series. Aided by this 
imputation and weighting process, all counts and rates, particularly for offender 
data, are estimates, although reliable ones. 
 
 Calculations of the time-of-day distribution for violent crime victimization 
for school-age youngsters (ages 6 through 17) were based on National Incident-
Based Reporting Data (NIBRS) for 2006 archived at the University of Michigan. 
Although NIBRS coverage is not nationally representative, there is little reason to 
believe that the time patterns are adversely affected by gaps in NIBRS coverage. 
In fact, state-by-state analyses of these time patterns reveals general 
consistency across various parts of the country, providing support for the 
assumed representativeness of the sample data with regard to time-of-day 
distributions. 
  
Homicide rate calculations and demographic projections relied on U.S. 
Census Bureau annual estimates of resident population by age, sex and race. 
Available race-bridged estimates were used to enable a smooth transition 
between the multiple-race classifications of the 2000 Census counts and the 
singular-race designations of earlier Census counts. 
 
 Finally, data on police personnel were drawn from figures published 
annually by the FBI in Crime in the United States. Information on federal 
appropriations for justice-related programs was drawn from figures compiled and 
reported by the National Criminal Justice Association, a Washington, D.C.-based 
justice policy organization. 
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Figure 1: Percentage Change since 2000 in Homicide Victimization by Selected Groups 
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Figure 2: Percentage Change since 2000 in Homicide Offending by Selected Groups 
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Figure 3: Homicide Offending Rates by Age, White Males 
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Figure 4: Homicide Offending Rates by Age, Black Males 
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Figure 5: Percent Gun Homicide by Offender Race and Age 
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Figure 6: Time of Day Youth Violent Victimization, School Months, 2006 
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Figure 7: Time of Day Youth Violent Victimization, Summer Months, 2006 
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Figure 8: Projected Growth in Population under Age Five 
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Figure 9: Federal Appropriations in Support of Law Enforcement and Juvenile Justice 
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Figure 10: Trends in Police Protection by City Size 
 
  
 
Table 1: Homicides by Victim and Offender Characteristics 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Pct change 
00/01-06/07
Under 14 898 962 916 887 886 885 895 930 -1.9%
14-17 798 779 770 750 794 851 964 969 22.6%
18-24 3,919 4,157 4,220 4,426 4,049 4,313 4,433 4,333 8.5%
25-34 3,954 4,091 4,160 4,242 4,154 4,346 4,316 4,344 7.7%
35-49 4,002 3,949 4,021 4,034 3,965 4,029 4,048 4,015 1.4%
50-64 1,239 1,291 1,325 1,362 1,465 1,502 1,667 1,605 29.3%
65+ 777 808 792 827 835 815 712 733 -8.9%
Male 11,800 12,226 12,399 12,798 12,560 13,140 13,399 13,256 10.9%
Female 3,786 3,811 3,805 3,730 3,588 3,600 3,635 3,673 -3.8%
Victim Race
White 7,828 8,189 8,089 8,218 8,253 8,391 8,255 8,286 3.3%
Black 7,239 7,294 7,539 7,698 7,341 7,763 8,167 8,117 12.1%
Other 519 554 577 612 554 586 611 526 6.1%
Offender age
Under 18 1,574 1,598 1,543 1,568 1,585 1,675 1,896 1,858 18.3%
18-24 7,012 7,354 7,221 7,352 7,045 7,561 7,859 7,534 7.2%
25-34 4,610 4,688 4,874 4,868 4,802 5,161 5,253 5,187 12.3%
35-49 3,366 3,401 3,409 3,469 3,465 3,552 3,544 3,518 4.4%
50+ 1,249 1,187 1,247 1,248 1,361 1,377 1,386 1,470 17.3%
Male 16,085 16,478 16,555 16,747 16,489 17,467 18,136 17,729 10.1%
Female 1,727 1,749 1,739 1,758 1,769 1,859 1,802 1,839 4.7%
White 7,829 8,189 8,234 8,098 8,318 8,379 8,296 8,290 3.5%
Black 9,486 9,553 9,562 9,836 9,442 10,412 11,115 10,814 15.2%
Other 496 486 498 570 498 535 526 464 0.9%
19,568
All victims
All offenders
7.4%
9.6%
16,740 17,034 16,929
17,812 18,228 19,938
15,586 16,037 16,204 16,528 16,148
18,295 18,505 18,258 19,326
Offender Race
Offender S ex
Victim age
Victim sex
  
Table 2: Homicide Victimization by Sex, Age, Race and Weapon 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Pct change 
00/01-06/07
Total 293 269 262 265 288 323 333 323 16.7%
Gun 232 186 211 193 230 255 274 243 23.7%
Non-gun 61 83 51 72 58 68 59 79 -4.2%
Total 333 333 300 332 349 376 459 468 39.2%
Gun 303 279 266 293 305 336 406 426 43.0%
Non-gun 30 53 34 39 44 41 54 41 14.5%
Total 1,276 1,406 1,417 1,481 1,370 1,434 1,382 1,406 3.9%
Gun 945 1,026 1,101 1,159 1,002 1,070 1,051 1,064 7.3%
Non-gun 331 380 316 321 368 364 330 342 -5.5%
Total 1,977 2,083 2,107 2,195 2,019 2,190 2,334 2,267 13.3%
Gun 1,782 1,791 1,898 1,977 1,839 1,991 2,102 2,069 16.7%
Non-gun 195 293 210 218 180 199 231 198 -11.8%
Total 3,683 3,829 3,862 3,927 4,051 4,082 4,012 3,982 6.4%
Gun 2,229 2,288 2,365 2,382 2,484 2,558 2,408 2,426 7.0%
Non-gun 1,455 1,541 1,497 1,545 1,566 1,525 1,604 1,556 5.5%
Total 3,384 3,395 3,578 3,693 3,595 3,798 3,900 3,963 16.0%
Gun 2,548 2,473 2,743 2,890 2,788 2,965 3,012 3,113 22.0%
Non-gun 836 923 835 803 807 833 887 850 -1.2%
Total 87 86 93 67 76 73 86 82 -2.9%
Gun 42 46 56 34 39 37 42 43 -3.4%
Non-gun 45 40 37 34 37 36 44 39 -2.4%
Total 57 50 83 51 54 55 57 68 16.8%
Gun 31 25 53 28 31 43 36 49 51.8%
Non-gun 26 26 30 23 23 12 21 20 -21.2%
Total 297 346 322 350 316 279 312 311 -3.0%
Gun 160 166 161 185 156 133 153 181 2.2%
Non-gun 137 180 161 164 160 146 160 130 -8.4%
Total 269 208 250 258 212 249 247 241 2.3%
Gun 155 129 177 166 133 155 186 167 24.0%
Non-gun 114 78 73 92 79 93 61 74 -29.7%
Total 1,671 1,683 1,621 1,616 1,616 1,692 1,607 1,629 -3.5%
Gun 809 745 782 741 735 837 765 768 -1.4%
Non-gun 862 937 839 875 881 855 842 861 -5.4%
Total 872 869 865 827 792 754 840 774 -7.3%
Gun 432 410 409 393 357 391 442 385 -1.7%
Non-gun 440 459 457 435 434 364 397 389 -12.5%
Female
14-17
White
Black
Black
18-24
White
Male
14-17
White
Black
18-24
White
Black
White
25+
White
25+
Black
Black
 
 
  
Table 3: Homicide Offending by Sex, Age, Race and Weapon 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Pct change 
00/01-06/07
Total 539 558 575 545 556 546 579 547 2.6%
Gun 368 335 366 362 344 367 380 384 8.7%
Non-gun 171 223 210 183 213 179 199 162 -8.3%
Total 851 840 798 843 876 960 1,130 1,142 34.3%
Gun 698 665 657 717 708 792 944 964 40.0%
Non-gun 153 175 141 126 168 168 186 177 10.8%
Total 2,397 2,644 2,578 2,535 2,495 2,559 2,536 2,408 -1.9%
Gun 1,461 1,595 1,673 1,579 1,515 1,660 1,602 1,535 2.7%
Non-gun 936 1,048 906 955 980 899 934 873 -8.9%
Total 3,971 4,022 3,935 4,085 3,871 4,243 4,570 4,416 12.4%
Gun 3,306 3,262 3,293 3,460 3,316 3,650 3,941 3,808 18.0%
Non-gun 665 760 642 625 555 593 629 608 -13.2%
Total 3,998 4,106 4,147 4,084 4,296 4,308 4,256 4,307 5.7%
Gun 2,143 2,130 2,318 2,235 2,301 2,402 2,299 2,327 8.3%
Non-gun 1,855 1,977 1,830 1,849 1,995 1,906 1,957 1,980 2.8%
Total 3,892 3,879 4,080 4,136 3,955 4,392 4,591 4,494 16.9%
Gun 2,623 2,523 2,829 2,890 2,749 3,187 3,270 3,248 26.7%
Non-gun 1,269 1,356 1,251 1,246 1,206 1,205 1,320 1,246 -2.3%
Total 65 73 65 79 63 47 61 67 -7.5%
Gun 21 22 27 28 24 15 25 26 19.8%
Non-gun 43 52 38 51 38 33 36 40 -19.8%
Total 61 69 59 56 46 67 62 64 -2.5%
Gun 25 27 26 18 23 33 38 36 40.1%
Non-gun 36 41 34 38 23 34 25 28 -31.7%
Total 206 242 271 260 260 250 263 278 20.7%
Gun 82 65 110 80 103 101 112 114 54.5%
Non-gun 125 177 162 180 157 149 151 164 4.3%
Total 251 272 250 259 228 289 286 249 2.3%
Gun 114 134 125 123 110 146 158 140 20.9%
Non-gun 137 139 125 136 118 143 128 108 -14.4%
Total 624 566 597 596 647 670 601 683 7.9%
Gun 260 224 254 230 268 258 257 269 8.6%
Non-gun 364 341 343 365 379 412 344 413 7.4%
Total 461 470 439 455 467 461 476 450 -0.6%
Gun 164 172 146 163 186 190 190 195 14.7%
Non-gun 297 298 294 292 280 271 286 254 -9.3%
Black
White
Black
White
Black
White
Black
White
Black
White
18-24
Black
Male
Female
14-17
18-24
25+
14-17
25+
White
 
  
Table 4: Homicide Offenders Ages 14-24 by Geographic Division and Race 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Pct change 
00/01-06/07
White 74 92 71 66 79 85 92 87 7.5%
Black 80 84 83 65 101 102 99 100 22.3%
White 289 124 318 305 292 255 284 251 29.4%
Black 777 296 682 761 708 782 830 757 47.8%
White 303 424 339 340 315 323 324 309 -13.0%
Black 1,001 1,160 1,091 1,050 938 1,142 1,226 1,135 9.3%
White 138 107 125 108 122 111 105 148 3.8%
Black 249 187 205 196 240 246 245 236 10.3%
White 268 264 346 343 269 314 292 285 8.5%
Black 1,028 906 1,079 1,146 974 1,110 1,178 1,251 25.6%
White 130 131 129 125 127 127 121 117 -9.0%
Black 407 447 417 404 339 417 466 463 8.6%
White 501 511 492 514 470 483 450 426 -13.5%
Black 597 588 546 641 641 635 735 694 20.6%
White 266 331 310 352 378 357 365 384 25.5%
Black 63 98 90 101 101 126 111 117 41.4%
White 826 885 923 832 888 927 938 834 3.6%
Black 400 441 469 442 493 511 504 425 10.5%
Pacific
New England
East North Central
West North Central
Mountain
West South Central
South At lantic
East So uth Central
Middle Atlantic
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Homicide Offenders Ages 14-24 by Population Group and Race 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Pct change 
00/01-06/07
White 809 915 866 813 763 733 728 632 -21.1%
Black 1,179 1,161 1,124 1,132 1,019 1,043 1,180 976 -7.9%
White 200 265 251 273 243 263 249 301 18.4%
Black 933 933 868 885 844 1,073 1,140 1,118 21.0%
White 255 209 265 244 261 239 251 261 10.3%
Black 673 696 698 731 728 716 778 663 5.2%
White 375 402 331 398 391 422 447 442 14.4%
Black 712 823 756 776 767 982 921 1,037 27.5%
White 295 335 296 316 337 334 287 304 -6.2%
Black 416 380 384 365 387 434 553 505 33.0%
White 205 180 188 192 226 210 214 222 13.3%
Black 253 199 203 240 243 245 290 289 28.2%
White 150 174 152 170 163 176 191 158 7.7%
Black 170 236 167 190 186 180 212 279 21.0%
10,000 - 24,999
50,000 - 99,999
25,000 - 49,999
1,000,000 +
500,000 - 999,999
250,000 - 499,999
100,000 - 249,999
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6: Change in Homicide Offenders Ages 14-24 among States 
 
2000-01 2006-07 % Chg 2000-01 2006-07 % Chg
Alabama 70 50 -29% 215 282 31%
Alaska 13 11 3 8
Arizona 257 300 17% 46 86 87%
Arkansas 54 42 -22% 126 109 -13%
California 1521 1618 6% 764 871 14%
Colorado 108 121 12% 46 40 -12%
Connecticut 51 43 -15% 66 63 -4%
Delaware 11 21 83% 23 50 121%
Georgia 132 118 -11% 447 530 19%
Hawai i 4 12 0 1
Idaho 14 50 264% 0 0
Illinois 314 211 -33% 818 711 -13%
Indiana 92 90 -2% 284 222 -22%
Iowa 28 34 21% 9 14
Kansas 112 70 -38% 40 88 120%
Kentucky 40 49 23% 113 76 -32%
Louisiana 67 60 -9% 461 524 14%
Maine 8 12 0 0
Maryland 68 84 23% 445 533 20%
Massachusetts 70 82 17% 65 129 98%
Michigan 140 137 -2% 588 728 24%
Minnesota 40 31 -22% 70 93 32%
Mississippi 46 28 -40% 254 183 -28%
Missouri 70 80 14% 273 251 -8%
Montana 20 17 -16% 0 2
Nebraska 38 33 -14% 5 18
Nevada 80 100 25% 55 88 60%
New Hampshire 11 17 57% 0 1
New Jersey 86 112 30% 238 358 50%
New Mexico 81 114 41% 11 7 -33%
New York 231 291 26% 473 659 39%
North Carolina 141 139 -1% 407 452 11%
North Dakota 2 6 0 3
Ohio 129 146 13% 317 456 44%
Oklahoma 73 84 15% 76 121 60%
Oregon 42 44 3% 15 9 -43%
Pennsylvania 148 136 -8% 526 570 8%
Rhode Island 21 14 -30% 30 7 -77%
South Carolina 65 92 43% 266 433 63%
South Dakota 5 8 1 0
Tennessee 98 103 6% 276 382 38%
Texas 811 676 -17% 535 689 29%
Utah 36 41 14% 4 1
Vermont 6 10 0 1
Virginia 90 99 9% 326 405 24%
Washington 131 90 -31% 59 43 -27%
West Virginia 21 26 25% 5 20
Wisconsin 70 57 -19% 156 230 47%
Wyoming 5 10 0 0
White Black
 
        Note: Percentage change calculations omitted where base counts are below 10. 
  
Table 7: Change in Homicide Offenders Ages 14-24 among Cities 
 
2000-01 2006-07 % Chg 2000-01 2006-07 % Chg
Austin 36 24 -33% 16 14 -13%
Baltimore 36 24 -33% 464 490 6%
Boston 15 9 -40% 36 64 78%
Charlotte 30 21 -30% 122 102 -16%
Chicago 294 157 -47% 656 460 -30%
Columbus 24 26 8% 54 93 72%
Dallas 121 65 -46% 194 116 -40%
Denver 24 34 42% 17 17 0%
Detroit 39 43 10% 496 602 21%
El Paso 13 14 8% 1 2
Fort Worth 41 31 -24% 28 41 46%
Houston 192 173 -10% 131 313 139%
Indianapolis 15 31 107% 104 103 -1%
Las Vegas 60 78 30% 38 76 100%
Los Angeles 475 379 -20% 300 233 -22%
Memphis 12 10 -17% 187 186 -1%
Milwaukee 45 47 4% 158 256 62%
Nashville 25 26 4% 95 112 18%
New York 284 191 -33% 555 436 -21%
Oklahoma City 21 25 19% 26 48 85%
Philadelphia 50 49 -2% 391 404 3%
Phoenix 149 163 9% 30 56 87%
Portland 12 9 -25% 13 7 -46%
San Antonio 73 71 -3% 26 36 38%
San Diego 26 34 31% 18 26 44%
San Francisco 25 33 32% 28 50 79%
San Jose 21 44 110% 3 4
Seattle 14 8 -43% 15 6 -60%
White Black
 
                    Note: Percentage change calculations omitted where base counts are below 10 
  
 
Table 8: Trends in Homicide Victimization Rates among Males by Age and Race 
 
White Black White Black White Black
1976 2.9 15.9 8.3 59.7 6.7 57.4
1977 3.2 15.7 9.1 57.4 6.8 54.3
1978 3.6 15.0 9.5 56.7 7.0 52.5
1979 3.7 16.2 11.4 59.6 7.5 56.2
1980 4.0 18.2 11.6 63.8 7.8 56.6
1981 3.4 15.2 10.7 56.3 7.7 53.0
1982 3.0 15.0 10.2 51.1 7.2 45.7
1983 2.9 13.7 9.0 48.4 6.5 41.0
1984 2.8 13.1 9.0 45.0 6.2 38.3
1985 3.0 16.6 8.6 47.2 6.3 37.7
1986 3.5 17.6 9.4 53.6 6.4 41.2
1987 3.2 22.9 8.7 57.8 6.1 38.8
1988 3.3 26.5 8.5 66.0 5.8 42.5
1989 3.9 33.0 9.0 74.5 5.7 42.5
1990 5.2 37.0 10.4 87.6 6.0 44.9
1991 5.7 42.8 11.5 99.6 6.0 43.9
1992 6.2 41.8 11.2 95.0 5.8 40.0
1993 6.4 47.0 11.0 102.9 5.8 40.5
1994 5.8 43.0 11.1 97.8 5.4 38.3
1995 6.0 39.9 10.9 82.7 5.0 33.7
1996 5.2 31.1 9.2 75.7 4.7 29.6
1997 4.0 25.0 9.0 75.6 4.2 27.0
1998 4.0 19.9 8.8 66.1 4.0 24.8
1999 3.5 19.0 7.7 57.6 3.7 21.6
2000 2.9 15.2 7.2 55.9 3.6 21.8
2001 2.7 14.7 7.8 54.9 3.6 21.4
2002 2.7 14.5 7.6 55.0 3.6 22.0
2003 2.5 14.3 7.9 56.1 3.6 22.1
2004 2.8 14.8 7.2 49.8 3.6 21.1
2005 3.0 15.6 7.3 53.6 3.7 21.5
2006 3.1 18.4 7.2 55.8 3.5 22.0
2007 3.0 19.0 7.3 53.6 3.5 21.7
14-17 18-24 25+
 
  
Table 9: Trends in Homicide Offending Rates among Males by Age and Race 
 
White Black White Black White Black
1976 10.9 73.0 21.8 166.4 9.8 99.6
1977 11.1 64.1 22.7 153.1 10.2 94.5
1978 11.1 65.7 23.9 158.8 10.5 93.8
1979 13.2 70.1 27.1 176.2 11.2 99.9
1980 14.5 83.2 31.0 198.1 12.2 104.8
1981 12.0 73.1 27.3 168.6 11.6 95.8
1982 11.8 64.1 25.0 155.4 11.0 83.6
1983 10.7 54.4 23.6 138.4 9.8 76.2
1984 10.1 53.9 24.2 125.6 9.7 71.8
1985 10.4 66.8 22.9 135.1 9.5 70.0
1986 13.8 82.7 24.7 156.0 9.8 75.0
1987 12.8 92.1 23.9 166.9 9.3 69.9
1988 14.4 116.8 23.7 203.4 8.8 75.6
1989 15.9 134.0 26.1 230.2 8.6 73.0
1990 20.9 178.4 29.8 270.3 9.1 77.8
1991 21.5 200.2 32.3 323.4 9.2 77.6
1992 21.9 189.1 31.2 298.2 8.4 71.1
1993 22.2 225.3 31.8 328.8 8.2 70.9
1994 22.8 212.0 30.8 312.5 7.8 66.0
1995 20.9 163.1 31.1 273.8 7.5 58.5
1996 16.2 124.3 30.2 266.7 6.8 53.7
1997 14.3 110.5 27.1 247.4 6.0 50.2
1998 12.3 81.8 27.1 218.7 6.2 45.6
1999 9.7 73.3 22.9 201.8 5.5 40.5
2000 8.2 66.2 21.7 198.3 5.4 41.2
2001 8.4 64.2 23.2 193.2 5.5 40.3
2002 8.6 60.2 22.2 183.7 5.5 41.7
2003 8.2 62.9 21.6 186.7 5.4 41.8
2004 8.3 64.2 21.0 172.7 5.6 39.2
2005 8.1 69.1 21.4 186.1 5.5 42.7
2006 8.6 80.3 21.1 197.0 5.4 43.8
2007 8.1 80.6 20.1 188.4 5.4 42.2
14-17 18-24 25+
 
 
  
Table 10: Percent Gun Homicide by Offender Race and Age 
 
14-24 25+ 14-24 25+
1976 51.2% 65.1% 62.2% 69.8%
1977 52.7% 64.8% 62.4% 67.8%
1978 54.0% 65.8% 63.4% 69.7%
1979 52.8% 66.4% 64.0% 68.8%
1980 52.5% 63.7% 64.2% 68.5%
1981 50.5% 64.5% 64.4% 67.7%
1982 48.6% 64.2% 60.3% 64.7%
1983 47.3% 62.4% 58.2% 62.1%
1984 49.3% 61.5% 59.9% 63.4%
1985 49.7% 61.8% 61.0% 62.6%
1986 51.4% 58.1% 65.6% 60.2%
1987 51.1% 58.4% 67.5% 58.3%
1988 53.6% 59.3% 72.0% 59.5%
1989 58.2% 59.2% 75.2% 59.4%
1990 60.9% 58.6% 77.8% 61.1%
1991 62.8% 59.3% 80.5% 62.1%
1992 65.2% 59.8% 83.0% 63.8%
1993 67.2% 60.2% 83.3% 65.3%
1994 68.1% 59.4% 84.6% 66.4%
1995 67.2% 58.9% 82.7% 63.7%
1996 64.3% 56.6% 82.7% 62.9%
1997 64.7% 55.6% 83.3% 63.9%
1998 61.0% 53.6% 79.2% 61.3%
1999 59.9% 52.0% 82.1% 64.7%
2000 60.2% 52.0% 80.7% 64.0%
2001 57.4% 50.4% 78.6% 62.0%
2002 62.3% 54.2% 81.3% 65.8%
2003 60.0% 52.7% 82.3% 66.5%
2004 58.8% 52.0% 82.8% 66.4%
2005 63.0% 53.4% 83.1% 69.6%
2006 61.6% 52.6% 84.0% 68.3%
2007 62.4% 52.0% 84.3% 69.7%
BlackWhite
 
